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CATEGORICAL MODELI,ING OF HUSSERL'S INTENTIONALITY
Imants Ba.uYs
King's College, The University of Western Ontario
This. paper is concerned with the application of constructions from category theo._rJ*tp
Smiih and Mclntyre's interpretation of Husserlls intentionality. r Not only did Eusserl's
own ideas change in the course of his lifetime2 but there are a number of interpretations of
Husserl's work3 so that the line of philosophical investigation that Husserl strongly
iniluenced is still in the process of development. In this vein, $milh_and"Mclntyre. harn
recognued"the potential for a possi.ble worlds interpre,-tation of iqte_utionality- in Hu,sser_lle,
w-ntiug-4 .whi,ch'has led th-em to exiend their interpretation to grve a lnauy rvorlds. acco.unf.
of.inJ"entionaliiy.s Thus, while Smith and Mclntyre have refuted interpretations of
Husserl's rloerno in terms of ideal objects, they have been willing to explicate the noetna
using possible objects. 6
There-areo however,.limitations to present possible worlds theories. Mos-t"notable,
pejbaQsn is the.static nature of such worlds. By isolating a discrete act of conscio-usnesl,
one.c.ons.tructs a collection of possible worlds that belong to that act. Whai one dom, 
-thus,
fol"a$-i-ngle act is. analogous to what oqe does when interpreting an elementary classical
.theory- usi n g classi.cal..models"
The.motivation for providing a possible worlds account of intentio,nali-ty,,however,
a-r-ises frsm the implicit presence of collections of acts which, as it were, further .defiae a11
ini-tial.-ac,t-,in"a'numb"er of po-ssible, po-ssibly iuc.ompatible, ways. One wquld like to- 
-bc.able
ls take" i-nto ac"couut the presence of such acts along the dimension of time which, 
-nat.urally,
lo-cally, orders such acts. In an effort to do this one can seek inspiration from some of--the-
developments in intuitionistic logic which have inmrporated the notion of movement?-and,
more.s.pecific&Ily, from the Kripke-Joyal semantics which explicitly involve categorical
constructions.E The modelling given here is not, of coruse, a semantics for a formal
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language, but an interpretation directly of mental events, in terms of categorical
constructions used for the Kripke-Joyal semantics.
In Sectionl the-key elemerrts-of"Smith and_Mclstyrdcigte1prciatioLqlfiu$fled]5
inLentionalitJt-arejrrielly skeLched. Srrecific categoricalcoasLructions-:.redeveJoped-in
Section.2 and thnrvn to ccrrespond,t"o the-elements 
-of-aLfuLentionalme,ntal enenlfur
Section.3- SQme strrecifie issues.r.egardiwlbeiaterBretation-of the pas.t, 
-beliefs and
act'ality ere raised-in sectio:ra.-"In_sec.ties-J tbediscuc0lan_-rsgoscluded*by_eompa_rins the
categorical interpretetion,-deyeloped"in_seetions:i-^aud-4*:rit}-[he_man$Jorld$
int erpretalios .of Smith_asd*ldelet$s.
L_IUSS ERI,, S LN rpN IT oNA!ITX.
Husserlwas_isteresledj-a_erplalsiugjhe_qa,ture'Oltlqs_e_!0ellalgsqlilghighsrg
ChAraqlqrrzed ly*rutenti"qn-alrtJ,_ 
_He ealled ia.cts of cAn$ciousn_e-$pl- !h_o,.se_e-v_qnt_s-:gtri-ch
r_elated.-lA,
an object."1 I.:s_tead pf*explicgll"Bgig_t*eqtiqnatily,by ex_qlqining t!e--na!gj-e_q{-t_hJ_p!.!gglq
tgtulri*s--wh-qh--aS!.q*o,f- cogscip-upsgs$ are, dir-gg!.e-d, gmith-and Mql+.tyrg h-av-e-gtalpqgd_tlel
Eugterj'j_aeqoust grq_ b_e viewgd a$_ o_ng w_biqb Feeks !9_ Ug,{_erstaq{ in_teqt!_o_qally.isler4gs of
thgrelations$p_b.,elseegtbesu-bje-c__t,and_thcebieqt-.r0
Eagh*qp!$crqu"s.-agl, acce-rding to Smith and Mclntyrg, con-sisls of-three conp-erpntl-
A-Aprgil,3*naens_atd aq__o_b&st,___Ahe aoes?q is the r_eal pad, gf a cp,nS=cio-u-s_ aqt.wtrieb makes.
the experienge intedioual"t_l-,T*c-ao,,er?.o_, g-s the other_hasd,_i,s n_e-t lre_all 
-but aq a_t_empor-al
kiu{qtneaula&_or_$raa-13. Ib_e_-oal"ologr_s-d*-si-a,t-us_of th-e 
_oljest is_rr$lquada_utL oq-this
reqe-usJ,. !hus* jm-act*miarl&Jisdir_eete.d to'ward- or i_s iale_n"tiqaal_ty relaledlq).as*shi?et
jf aqd*edy-if-the-aet (or its.noesis).entertaius a eer,tain--noe-natie*Siau-and,that Siqn
pres_qnbes.-t hat ob iecL. " 13
Objects of natural experience are transcendent objects in the sense that they can
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never be fully conceptually captured in a single act. This is due to the fact that the
perceptual evidence for the existence of such objects is always incomplete from the point of
view of a single act.14 In fact, perceptual experiences are more complicated than other
intentional experiences such as, for example, judging, remembering and imagining, because
they entaii a sensory aspect. The barrage of sensations or hyleis an aspect of the noesis
and requirs a Sinn to give it shape so that it can be experienced as a perception of
something.ls For Husserl, perception forms the basis of one's understanding of the world
and hence received much of his attention.16
This problem of the perception of transcendent objects highlights the fact that uelac:i
g-f sgnsci.ousness exists in isolation frsm other acts. Something about the Object _is always
lef! opea in an act with a particular Sinn. In order to explicate the way it whic-h_ f,urth-er
de-t-e.-rm=ruatious. of an object are possible, Husserl introduced the totion of .an ac-t::-ho--ri-zo_n- 
-
0.,eple-c-tion of possible acts whose Sinne are compatible with the Sinnof thg o_ngin'al_.aeL
t-b"-a"t..ea-n further determine a given object. rT parallel to this act-hori-zo-u i-s*aa
-ob"ject-- horizQn which is the collection of further determined objects that th-es_e_fu_rth,e_r-,a.ets.
Qf cOnsciOusness are directed- tO.warde .18
asgo-rdiug tq smith and Mclntyre's interpretatioq- o{ Eu-$_erl"s_t}s-o.I_Lff*eaeh EipL@
b-€,b-r-oken dowa into two components: the'predicate senses,which prescribe_ t!p*properties
that aq object is to have, and an x which specifies the object to which the,pr_orer-t&s*arc
ascribed*11--.F-ru-t-her d9ter-mination of an object, then, consists of further conditions-tba! are
to be mei-by*a-u_o-bje-c_t,, glven_in 
-ae--t's w-dh thesame,X
following an examination of Husserl's notions of horizon and manifold, h,ewe:et,
S-mit-h and Mclntyre relaxed the constraints on the definition of an act-horizon, so that the
sinne of the acts in the horizon need not be strictly compatibie with the srrzz o__f 
_the
q-r-igrgal- a-el20 al-owing for further perceptions of ar object that reveal it to.- be 
-dif&-re-g.i
trom wha.tit was originally perceived to be, and so that these further aets Leed.np-t
V
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g-g,cggsqdly.fqrther determine the object in the sense of ipcludipg fugh,-e1lnform.atio-4 ab_oul
l!-.?.1.It is this more liberal interpretation of horizon that is adopted he-re-.
For Busserl, each &ct-horizo,u is predeli-neated iu aq a-qt- qf c-onseiou$n-ess so 
-t_ha-t_!s-!o_e.
pps-sible a-ejs are understood to further determine {he object of the original act, an-d _o-t-be_rs
aJs$ee-----------------n ,as sot- doiqg so. These fult-her possible acts canlot be mqrely iogleatly p_"qssi.b]e,
b-ut.must be motivated by what the subject believes to be p,o-ssible.22 T$s bri_ags to Ugh-t
tlte ipportance of 
-relevant background beliefs and items of knowledge t-h4t d-eteruue
w"H-eh Sinne arc to be.included in on aat::-hod?e8*23
T-be aet-horizon has a temporal structure. In the case of percsption, fo1 ex4pB_!g, 
-ogg
ean 
-h.ave a series of possible future perceptions that further determines ag obi)c!,,_ Thus,i-f
gBe 
.w9-Le. 
-t"o- -see a ttee o,n a hillside, walking closer to the tlee _qra51 reveal it to be a malle-
t:e-e-,"n-th--red lea-ves, and so on, 
-These further possible perception$ wguld be=acts in-.the
bp"uzoa--oJ-t-h-e-original act in which the tree is first noticed. Now, if the tr-ee \{'-ere a map_l.q
treeiu.t-h re-d leaves on a hillside, then there would be a nun,b-el oJ possib,le.co-mb_inat.ia,ngp-f
furt-her" per-ceptions, that would reveal this. Smith aud.-Me-Iu-tyre eall c-o--q-tinuous s-eri-e-s*of
Bos"sihle,f,urther perceptions, 'possible verification chains', and collectiqgg.o_f_,s-e-n_e-s_ei[
{ur-t}e.:"p'"erccp*-t.ious, whic-h reveal the. same ohrjeet, they call a family of pqosib_le veri-fi_qatio:
qlr-ams'-24 Thus, the act-horizon can be articulated by talkirrg a-b,out tbe 
-c-p.Jleqti-o*n-o.f-a[l
f-amilies of possible verificaJion" e_halss.
The igtroduction of families of verification chains allows for the developmeqt o-f_g
pos-qible worlds interpretation of Husserl's intentionality. 'Each family of verification chains
p,Oltespouds to a possible object, but since these acts which constitute the hOrizon a_r*e-..ta_bA
qo-direated with the original act, that original act can be understood to be direcled- ia*a11y
of 
-a num-ber o-f possible o-b,jects iq possible wsrlds.
Co-{irectedness requires that the Sinne of any two acts in the horizon have
the same determinable X- the same X as the Sinn of the original act 
- 
and
V
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that their respective rrcontentsrr (conj<lint predicatmenses) be mutualiy
rrharmonioustt, compatible according to the subject's conceptual scheme.25
Lt."is 
-thi*s abtlity t,o identify a lumber of different ways of completing tbe same o-b_jeetr
ia.t.ended in the act, by examining that act's horizon, that allows for a possible tsg-Lid.s
a-q-eouu-t of i nt enti o na-lr,,tJ.
Eowever, Smith a.ud Mclntyre, in their extension of Husserl's work, forsake the very
temporal structure that allows for the presence of possible objgcts by conceiving of t.hemas
po"s.sible.objects in possible worlds reached by a choice function for any given act, 
..Jlhe
effo-r,t here, on the other hand, is to retain the ternporal structure of the horizon and to
shorv how specific categorical constructions, those used in the definition of Grothegdieek
t"op-oi,. cas provide a more dynamic many worlds interpretation of intentio"udr.gr.
2. GROTHENDIECK TOPOI. :
1
Some simple constructions from category theory are introduced in this section, with the
assumption that the reader is familiar with the basic notions of set theory. Categories,
pretopologies, sites, functors and sheaves, the ingredients of Grothendieck topoi, are
defined below.26 These will be used to model Husserl's intentionality in the remainder of
the paper.
To begin with, a category is a collection of nadeswith anows between them, known
as a directed, graph, to which further conditions apply. The nodes are usually called objects
and the arrows sometimes dso called rnorphisms. If Cis d, category, then C Ob27 is the
collectionofobjectsof Cand CAr2Eisthecollectionof arrowsof C. Theobjectatthetail
of an arrow is known as the domain and that at the head of an arrow as the codomain. If.
Cis a category and / is an arrow of C, with domain o and codomain D, then this arrow is
usuaily denoted u oJO.
In order for a directed graph to be a category, it must obey the laws of closure,
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identity and associativity:
(i) Closure: lf. o Jioand b Ac arearrows of a category C, then there exists an arrow in
C which consists of / followed by g. Thib arrow is known as the composition of f and g
and is designated by a&s.
(ii) Identity: For each object oof a category Q there is an identity arrow, Io, with the
property that, if oJiois an arrow of Q then 1J= f : f lt
(iii) .4ssoc iatitity, n o Jt &t Lais a configuration of objects and arrows of C, then
f (sh): (fs)h.
Thus, a category is a collection of objects and arrows with some straightforward
properties. The collection of all sets with functions between them is the most obvious
sxampl€ of a category.
Dilferent pathways in a category can be indicated using diograms. If all the
pathways between any two objects in a diagram are the same arrow, then the diagram is
said to commute. For example, the following configuration of objects and arrows from a
category C
o 9",f' lriq,-d
1t
is a d.iagram. If fg : i t then the diagram commutes.
Furthermore, the above diagram is a pallbock sguore if it has the universal property
that for every x e COD and arrows rLiaand s /,c with 0S 
- 
rlf,there exists a unique
arrow x o ,athat makes the following diagram commute.
''1tt ;... o, \
I u-g\ lr' Pb lr0\; e 
,+d
\/
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The PD inside a square identifies it as a pullback square.
"With the aid of the notion of a pullback square, the concept of lo-coli-tg eaLhe
inJroduced in a ca-tegory. This is done by associating with each objestju a category a
numberof-c,ollections olarrows that terminate at that object. Such collecti.o-us*olasow.r,
satisfyiug tb-e clo-sure conditions below, are ealled- c oae.ts. If 
-au object -tha!-rs the d.ouain-oJ
au-affow,is thought of as a 'firture' state with,tespect to the codomain of.au arrow,Jtren
different.-covers can beinterpreted asdiffrrent po.rsible futures. li
More formally, a pretopology is an assignment2e
coa: c ob 
-, 
(c Ar)PP
which takes a e C Ob to a collection of sets of arrows of Cwith codomain o, satistying the
following conditions:
(i) 0FaCoa
That is to say, the empty set cannot be a cover of o.30
1(ii) {a 
-3-ay e a Col
That is to say, the singleton consisting of the identity will always be a cover of an object.
f_(iii) LetXbeanindexset,and Yrbeindexsetsfor reX. tf {ac -',atxe8e aCou
f
and for each z e X, {afrJ!-a;. g e Yr} e orCoa then
- 
ft^{o;Oo: y € Yrand ge,4 e a Cou.
In other words, covers can extend indefinitely into the future, since the elements of the
covers of the codomains of arrows in a cover of a can themselves be composed with the
elements of a cover of o to give a new cover.
f(iv) If {o;La,xe 4 e aCoa,whereXisanindexset,and b-9-aE C Ar,thenforeach
f:
r e X the pullback b , o or4b of. frilong g
Barus s
fi' a 9l ,oarr
It: Pb lr^l' ln
existsand{D'oo,!o:leX}ebCou.ffi"rds,foranassignmenttobea
pretopology, any specific cover must be sufficiently mobile to become a cover of any
possible future state.
;fcateggry C, together with a pretopology.Cgtr, ?$*A*-p:dgred_paif <_C,Cpa>,
fu-tu-geq ca4 be asqocia-ted with-each olbgl. The next step is to identify the categorical
structures which can be used for the interpretation of events that take place within this
temporal grid. To do this, the notion of a functor is needed.
A functor is a structure*preserving function between categories. As such, it takes
objects to objects, arrows to arrows, and preserves composition and identity. That is to
say, for categories Cand D, a functor Fis defined as a function Jt C--D with action
at--+aF for objects and (a JA!,-,1op F ,iDf) for arrows so that
(i) (/g)r 
- 
fFgF whenever /9 is defined3l
(ii) loF : lorfotall o€ C Ob.
A contraaariantfanctor is a functor that turns around the directions of arrows so that
domains become codomains, and codomains become domains. That is to say, in the case of
a contravariant functor, the action for arrows becomes
pJtT r-*(Dr F,otr)
and (i) above becomes
UdF: gFfF whenever /9 is definedin C Ar.32
fhe.-flnclors of in-t€re$L here are contravariant functors that map arbitrary categories into
lhe category S whose objects are sets and whose arrqws are,funqtions. The 
_f*unqtor-itse_1fis.
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calle-d astack. For a e C Ob, oFis called astalko\ fibreover_@,asd saeg{js,talled_a
genn-
Thir coastruslr_on cau be visualize_d-as 
-a.4,1_aq4r grl*d,uade up of-Jhe-.obiscts and
arrows-of-a,,eat-eg,ory witb stalks, filled with germs, sitting over the o-bjeSts like whe*ali:r_a
wheat fidd. 
-W*hat }ap,pens,in*tbp coursg of modelling, is that the catega-Li-ed{nd
represe&ts,temp-o-ral movement-, the stalks 
-th-e directedaess at a given_!lo-!oen-t, and the
&eru0s-t.be-p4rticulars"ofevente. All that remains now is to employ the notion of locality as
given by the pretopologies.
f^Let ( C,Cou> be a site and {a"--a a: r E X} e a Cou then the pullback of. fralong f,
is called o 
' 
o 
-l rrclr nf f qlnno f i< f''-x ^ a *g 4oV and the pullba k of { along /" is called ax, a on Lorfor each c
and y in the index set X, as shown in the diagram.
or,o oyLoa
l,; Pb 1,,r f^ Ia;-+a
f-' F&If F is a stack over c then the image of ar, 
o o#oris called o{ --j-(ox, a, ar)F and,f, F.
the image of. orJLais called aF 
-J-arF, for aJI r, y e X.
T,he,geru6-irlhe stalk-s are. sot .unrelated to sne another, but follow-iu rcve$e
-dreqtiou, the pathways taken by the a$gws Thus, for so e oF, if b 
-9-a eQAr,then so
gets carriedto sogF 
€ 
,Fs3. Now, theJrretopo-lqgJ:oq-a-*c_a_Le&orJ-eaa be us_edlo d€fiae.
ctraraeleristics of tbe relatioaships between the germs. Iu p-agtlc.-ulaq if€ells-s_ia*stal"}q pver
a-qqllel coinciding in future states given by pullbacks origlnated frola 
_t-he _q,aase€,ejejnlhe
pre$entn then tbis gives a way of characterizing stalks for wbieh,futurq-co*aditions grve
idaruatioa about a current state o-f affalfS.
More formally, aslac&-tr is a sheaf over the site < C,Coa> if it satisfi,sgj_he
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c o ng atib ilitA c.o n diti o ru
Cicen-anJr-rnyer {t3", x e E e a CoaJst*,e C Obasd aqy. couecti
geru$ {sre orF: s € 4 that,are Aairwise. comBagible, i.e., sfi: tV4for all
E, ! E X, there js-exactly one so e cf'sgibatl oflr= lrfor all x € X.
That is to say, whenever:he€erm$ ol stal-ks lq a--eoygr-Lbat*are-plirwr$,e.pulledback-and
Sqw-u t-o be t-he same originated from a single germ, then the s!-a-c-k- is^ka-o:sp,as-a.sIeal.
Ihe-collections of sheaves over a site generate a category C Sh called a Grcilteadic&
tppes.
3. A CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN INTENTIONALITY AND TOPOI.
I-be correspondence between acts of consciousness and the elementq-qfGptbegdiegklgBgt
hinges on the use of a category to reflect the organization of possible acts ig 
_!i!qeJ!hg
jdes*ti*figgli9a-of ger.lu-Jith the possible obpcts of mental events charaptqriz-ed bJ
:gies-tr..9pali.tfagd-of a cove-r of a categorical object with a family of verification chai_q*sJ!
fu the purpose of this sectien to explicale,tleSe ideas.
As"tarting poist-for lhe development of this modelling, is the noticing that lived;cts
deopscjouoness can be thought of as discrete events, strung together, somehow, 
_i.Iltiqe*as
pa$-sf-!-be-9xp€desce gf.a person.3l- 
-Tbgg;g*o,bjept e in a c*g-tggory Qcaq be thought ofal
a-gi":ngle 
-a"et-,,vnth the*ar-ro[s- hetw$n objects-as the transitions from one possiblege!_!g.
asstler.- For the purposes of this modelling, a future event for event a woul,d_be*aqeyed-0
for which th.ere is an arrow b &a E C Ar. The d.irection for the arrow caa b-e ia-t*erpreted
LY--thiukisg-offutute events as those co-ilg towaldS;-pgrgen. If one allows only future
acts that cannot be genuine replications of past acts, one could choose only categories in
which there are no auows a h,b€ C Arfor every future b.35 If one makes thefurther
restriction that a person can get from one act to a next in only one way, then the category
representing possible acts in time becomes a partially ordered set. Leaving open the widest
10
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scope for interpretation, in thiq diJc_u0.$i,Qp_, gatggories, ag gugh,. c_Aug$peLd_-tp_the- dmaus_Af
Bas$-l-bl9--aets of consciousness. To each person one assigns a category that rep_rese.atg__theil
Da6$ible-p.ast, present and future acts. Within such a category, a pgtlgn_\pqul_d*tm,ce-a,palh
tsls t h-e paa! 
-i!-t o-thelulure..
Eaeb tltentional, mental event, for Husserl is characterized by a .9_,iAf o_r ueCagtgg
tha*t.difeqts the act lgwards an objgct. As Smith and Mclntyre have suggested, thg--bgd_gg
qA$Le_d b: the Sinne c4g be moved to the objqcts that an act,is direc!*e*d_lp:v-"U.d$,J[bgl9
tlose-p-*b.iec-ts are'p-p's_sible o_=bjec"ts.36 In the spirit of their enterprise, the g----------------_lzais hglte
dls*eSlg-d"Sg.l_hal,the directedn,ess itgelf is podelled by the sheaves wl'ich detqrgr4e- tfo
qkulkg.qv-er 
-th,e o-bjects itr a q4tegory, thg predicate contents and X replaced by the po$_sjble
qLbsls-Lv-Hqb- are r,nodelled by the germ! in th-e--9!alks, and any residual e*pegqaee"-af
l0eali-qg that 43y characteizn noentata, moved into the catego:ical Object itself, w*hiqhjS,
basiedly-,. the- poes'ds, the lived part of the act.37 Thus, the directedness of a,a. a-st-is lelg
soasrd*ered.to be the actiou of a single sheaf F in c sh on a4- o--bjepl-_aof_e.
&jSj"ppgrt_a$-t.te go_tiqg thal possible obigts persfqt iq !Ugq. For example, if an act
at ais directed towards the germ soe aF, then, for anyfuturestate 6with, &ae C Ar,
the object so of the mental act o becomes the possible object s ogF e DF by the action of the
function aF 9F ,bF 
€ 
S Ar. Bpsagge--qt-!h-,e- gg-,4!.ravariance of_-t_he funcj_p* g"_A*i?clglhal
-a-Ppear o-t-a gtven poiut in tipe, are- qa$red, po-psibly in changed form, !s!g._the-luture.
T.hei.nte-rc$ti.ng feature of Eusse-r-llp.illeutro-sality however, that sheaves_grler-gjiLe
dlpw ole to model, !s 
-qgt -tle simple s!ryctu:q of intentional mental 
-ey-e-qts-and tbeir
effec.ts oq,tLe*fdure.-butlhe iqflue-s-qe-afubq futug*gn the p-resent. In order to model ttr.!s,
the familiee oj.possitrtsve:ification chains, the collections of temporal sequeeceg,that
de-teusi4epossrb-le,.objeeiuare to correspond to the covers of aq object ain a qategorLe.
T.hs*dlows f,or one way of makiug p:eerse i-he notions of 
-syulhsissfiden_lificallse,
uhereby the Sinne of the acts iq au act-hp-rizon form one lcomposi-te .9iznl aud th*e-i-Aenti-ty
11
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qf 
-the-Jaer"oss the ac-ts itr "ar ac!=!*aeae.
Inlhc 
-first- case, by conceptualizipg a$- a-cl ho-ri,zqg-a6--a cqllec-tio!-af--ve-n-fi.eaiiss
*ai,as-, theuselves consisting of possible, though experiencable nqls, o4_e_,rep*l_4-c^e^s_lb€.
iysth*esis of identification of the Sinne.with !!9 actual Sinne of the acts f91-41gg-a-Eayer.
ILLbe.s,e-cond case, the possible obict determinsd by the Sinns.ot ayeriflcaJlos--clai!
wsdilbe. mQre or less characterized in mutually compatible,rqals- by_JLe*aqgs of a
verificati-os chain. Therefgre, rather than retaining the notion of the objgct aE .$la-t_r_e*alang
the,-uerifieaiiou chain, one can allow it to be the object that would be "det-e*rpi-_np_*djLa
partr cular 
-ae-t- in-au*igtiarias.
&*may be-.u,sefrd to-_l_oq*k-.al a4 exa4ple. 
_,One maX Se-e yhat loqts_l&e a tree in an
ori$sal--ael sfper-cepti-on. ]Ihe act-horizon consists of a num_ber of ysugqatrge_chai!$
:uheJe-ihis t-ree is g:plored in particular ways, revealing it to be pe.r.-!=apq_A-!qapl_e Ege-wil}
red-l.gaygq,-o-n"a-billside, and so on. Al alternate collection of verilcatioglbal$_lgqy
relleal-tl-e-jrce-to*bglhe holograpt'!,-c- image of a maple tree with red learles, 9n 
-a bllside
and.so on. "At the point- of the initid*ast, one has not yet determined that the trw is a rcal
tree-.rather t-han _tbelqlographic image_of such a tree. There AIe _At least three eg_s_sjlle
obi:cts, theq, that 
_are prqsent in tbe r_,qiliat act-fqflhis egtqple-lb9!99j€"itlg
delgdued rrrlbqu-t.judgement as to its reality or non-reality, the tree interpteted j€j
uapl,e !"rec. atrd-thelree--i-aierprete-d--as a holographic image of a nqaple tree. In otler uqds.
eSeh.ob&etsas--be*u,ad*erstaad- as-"a possible obJect, determined as tha! poosr-b-le objgel*gdy
ug-tO-a-CeltArn,-p-oin-t. That is to s4y, the changes of the object on,a,..co_ver 
-qag_be
tr:Ide-r-s*to9--d.A6-_cp.4tIlejis€, or veritying the possible obtct given in the.iur--t_ial sgt
Igs-ugLaforu.ulalios",t-be-role that the object-horizon caq.-haye iq dele-ruoJs-uglh€
objeet i-a the-ini-tial actn is.rev-ealed by Lhe compatibility condition. If there is a sequ-eaee-gI
future mentd-cv-eatc iuwhich "t-he objects that are determined are pairwise rerg3le-d ta, be
the-same-oblbct isarurcpdat-e fu-rther-fu-turq-states, then they can be said to deterqi4e a-
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relstble,sfie_cljn---the._o_ri_Srnal act. This is just a sta|eg-e-4_! pf-!h-e cqmp"alibili_tyepldili-Ag
when the future mental states are the categorical objects of a cover f-ol a4_Ab_jggt_d_AI_Ag!
glegn$*cJausstrl.
Finally, j-t cal be s_hown that the collgclions q_f falsrliefl.p.fpossible verificatio,n ch_ains
salis-fy t-he-defi.ning conditions for a pretopology defi-ned in tle last se-ction.-,e,oa-dtion (i) is
met-tri-dally, in that an act-horizon must consist of 4t lgast ong agt.*.-Q_q-n{i_tien (iilis
qlq;-q 
_i4!_erqs_ting. It translates into the statement that an initial aC! mUq-t*be_ag
a-st-*horizp-n in and of itseif. This corresponds to the case in the example a_bove rvhe*re.-a-q9
suspe-nds judgement as to whether or not the tree is a real tree or a hologrg,phic i-m_a€e_aurl
the-o-bje--cJ. of the act is only that which is determined in the aet_itself.
eo-n-di-ti-on (iii) gakes precise the notion that no obict is ever fully dgte-r^u*in-eAJul
Sub"iee-t.-to further determinations. Any act in the horizon is itself an 
"qngr^u-AJ*agt._Wlhjl6
collectipn qf- act hsrizons. These help to determine the object of such an act--in*t-he-acl
hmaou"_rshieh_"iu turn is part of the horizon of the origtu-al_a_ct-.
Qgnd$ioqliv)"s-!a!e-S that the possible determinations of objects at a given po-iulj!
tiBe-are*uaJl-os!,-b.ut modified under changes of circumstance. In the exampl_e_alqvg,
EuppA$g-0*o is the action o{ turning around and speaking to someone and then-f-a.elglhe
bee-.-agai-n.. The options that one had initially are still there, but in modi-fi-pd fors.
Slppqse tbat-o-n-e h-ad $po--ken t-g thg ar,tist responsible for the-holograpf,ic maple tree. O-ne
cardesaddrtion-d in{-otmaliou- into act 6 when one again confronts the tree. Orre i.$__s*tdUeftr
tul!*h,!he-aet-horizonq that one started-,with, but the furt[er acts would.be_._q"qd-6sd
bec-ause of {he changes in expectation, perhaps, of what this object that is tA*be
gnsoun-t-ere-d is like. In act 6, just as in act o however, the qbjee,t l-_eed-_upLk"furlhcl
dei-ermined, as demonstrated, for example, by consid-ering that th-e per$on._c_1-al!m_4&lojg
tLe--arl-is"t had lied about the tree being a ho-lo€raphic_ 
-i.m-agg.
Suplose, however, that the act a-3-b were to take one into a vgry d.ifferent-Situa-tia!.
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$glpg_qe, fqr e..''ca!qple,_thet t-he, ttqgLry-erg tq- bp vaporizgd iq Q q_Uqlqal "bql_qcgUql_agd$g
qbserver, s.omehqlg-lqlla3uJeu-61y, lpued, so t[a! the--o5_r,giagil_ fqrt_ler {etefprn_aliqg1]gdd
nolbe possible. In such Lcase. the pullback of g, given as (@ *a b)Aa, would give rise to
a function orr 46r'ob)Fthat would correctly rellect what had happened to
s,eo,F,38na-ely,thatithadbeenvapourized.Inotherwords,atD@
possibiUty_of 
,vegfyi,u& the_Lr-e_s*eqge_ ef a--v,Ap9U31z9{ lreg or yApo,W1agd_hp_l_qg,rAphisjlqa€e_Af
q'!ree" One would never be able to decide, perhaps, which it would have been in the first
place.
9ne of the benefits of this uqode-lligg"_ig 
-t-hat ca!_egotrcal_OtrU,c-tu-res allow_for ag
lqterpretaliosjlt-:rb*c-h ob$t-s- are-allowed-!o ch4nge faithfully with changes tg-lg_age a,e,
tq.:Lbe next.
4. THE PAST, BELIEFS AND ACTUALITY.
Eor Husserl-an.actls,temporal horizosexte,*ads not-only into the future, but into thela,st
as--lrell- There are,- 1s1 ore-ple, possible past perceptions that one- could trarejarLhufiirl
rcss-ihle, "not experieuced"act c, tlat can nonetheless inlluence the expedqeceii--c.
Sin0ilarhr, the past portions of Lhe verifica-tion chains of Smith and Mcb-ty-rellcanleseen
as arro rrys-leaving-t he4 ref,ent -
Eo-wever, what cau or cannot be recovered from the past is not a matter-ofuhepasL
but"ofjhe-pr.esenlaud thp-fu-tue-that is to say, the past is o-nly applicalle to an acl
igmfar.as"il'"cosdiiio-n6 uhatlapneno in t-be-p_rerest or can be _recoy_eredin a fu:tier_act_In
the present modelliug,,then, all of tbe,-possible pasts converge iq tle presenJ-rv.lucb_alone-is
4ecessarylor understanding the future possibilities. This reflects the 4otion tbat th_e+asj
has beet..urat.ted ,y takiug a specifie path. The possibilities that could have existed and.
those that can existin*the future are afuqction of the beliefs that are possible {t_ary_grve.n
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aci*Ihese--beliefs themselvm,, are determi,qe-d*by the actual path that has been tra-nersqd.
lLkeepin&.with"the notion that beliefs predelineate theIossible future determinatioas_.of.an
gb.ies-t"*-o*s"e-'has"to po,sii Lhat "t*hg pretopology Cou on a category Cis such that every cover
specifies only those futures that are held t-o be possible. For example, if one is co-nfronted
sith-ruh.at appears to be a maple tree with red leaves and has no und-erstaudr-ag*of whatn
holographic image is, there is no cover for those future events.wbi-ch jnlact reve-al-the
m,aple tree rviih red leaves to be a holographic image. It is importaqt to,ao-te-,bsreolha.Li[,
ia^facf"*'one.is.exposed to a holographic image, rather than a real tree, t,he-re-ar-e-frture
gvents^-to-.s.ubstantiate that. These do not, however, constitu-te ve_nfieatip_u_dal"ns,sirce
there.is uo possible object in the original act which is to be verified. In the absense-.ofa
cover"-ihe compatibility condition does not apply, and despite the presence of comp-atible
fui-ure-obiects-,no-po-ssi-ble-ob&-et- o-f tbejree as a holographic image,ls pre,qegl- i_ujhe
o-riginal act.
But this brings up the problem of actuality. Not all possible past or future paths can
be traversed. Suppose one does, in the above s;lample, attempt to traverse the future path
that corresponds to the tree being a real tree, only to find out that it is a holographic
image. In such a case, the continuous perception of the tree as a real tree explodes forcing
the object one has chosen to be'cancelled'.al The hyte stemming from the actual world are
not those of the original choice of object, but of an object which was not before present,
though, or course, an unjudged portion ofit could have been chosen as the object of the
original act. It is interesting, however, to note that there is an interplay between the
actual and the possible according to Husserl, because of the role that Sinne play in giving
shape to sense impressions.
5. COMPARISON OF TEE CATEGORICAL AND POSSIBLE WORLDS MODELS.
hor"d"er--Lo de-yelop their!_ossibfe_w-o-.rlds,ihes;yJ_zutb aud MeJntyreiqtroduced*the no
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qf-pa-ssibk-v-erifi*eatisu-ebar,mJplle-cli-o-qs- qf-.wUsh, c*0-u$J-itul9 as-aellc ]odzar*lhe.r
abstracted the.possible objects.defited,by families of s-uch chains frop the temppr.dfftiltrg
jg-w-hieb they origi-uale.Jaking their cue from Carnap,s meaning funguggs, 
_t_hey weut on
Lodefine the Sjzz as that function which selects, for any given possible wo--rld, an-objecli!
$hat world to be the object of an act. Smith and Mclntyre made the d.istinction bg-tween a
Husserlian possible worlds theory in which the notion of. Sinnis retained, that is tp_salr, a
theory i-u:u-bicb llag-aetbintentionality*consists in a pattern of directgdnesg that reacbes
inlo-:ario-ur difierenlpossible worlds^u:rder the noematic guidance of the act's Sinqr11.'_aud
a purelossible.worlds theory in which-. the ,Sinz is 
-deleted and which "asoum.:es that
intention consigts in a complex relation, a pattern of directedness, that obtains betwegej
pglogi-43-gives"gq$s-ibJp world and certain possible objects, i.e., objects in various possi-ble
worlds'r.4 s
Sesides the fact.-that these possible rcorlds have been isolated from t,he sequenc.e-of
gostribte-acts--that gave rise to them, the pure possible worlds acc-ount appears io--c!.augelhe
aggnalsiruet:rre of an act of consciousness in a fundamental way. As stated in t-beffcotd
qUotaiion iu..Lhe paragraph aboven this accouqt assigns te a person in a grven po-ssible wprjd
.a possible o-bject, thereby losing the self of intentional mental events. There is a differenr.e
between saytug that Jhe domun of a meani4g function is a thinker over time or a collestian
of possible*worlds. In the former case, the functioa replacg the dire'eJednes!_of
inteutionality- In the second case, the meadng funet-isurelates pos,sible rryor,Lds_aEd ob.iects
in those rvorlds without any reference to a self that persists betrveen possib-Le worlds.
One-can, in faci-, recover Smith and Mclntyre's p-ure possible woddrJtreory-of
inleniionatit'rfton-tnecategorical account without losing the temp-oral. coltext or the-relf.
Tq do this,-"oaelets"*the category C be a partially ordered setaa and one defiu-es a-parLia]
section to be a farlial function from the elements of the partially ordered set C Ob to the
collection of stalks over C defined by a sheaf F, so that functoriality is pre-.oerved,,-Abalis.
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to say, one defines a partial function s: C Ofu-rS 06 with action o*rowhich is such that,
if b 
-9-a e C Ar and sO is defined, the s, : sagl.
*Eussed lpeaks-qf*both"-as internal horizon and- an exter4al=fug11zoJ* tAejormer
collesposdiag to the furthq determinations of the characteristie-s*q1a.a 
_object, and the
lallerlo--tbe relatioushiP$ that an object has to all other obtcts in its enviroqn*enillllir
vi-alhe external horizon th-a{.,,in principle, an entire possible world is.-r*e_v.ealed,ju*_whieh-a
Posu-ble'obict is situated. But t-hes, !qgr,e-ge-"q,e:ally, 
-tbqc-o:mp-l,ele future--deteruuratioas
Qf a &erm so at-anevcal.ae.e-Ltir-q. p-o!$!le-:r*o:ldJhs partiat uot-tqul-Tls,-the rrossihre
tcodds-of-Smith and Me_lutyresepartial.s_e*c,t_ions that are rglev,an.t_lg.d! aetO*r-evediag
hox t'hes*e-poffiihLe 
-rvor-lds can dev*elop, and are not just rel-evant to_a cisgle act- It irrhe
-aaiegary-af Po,ssib-l-e.acto.Jts-e-LLlblLt glues together the determinations that form a pqssible
tsodd--Thus-*thapaitern oldiree-tedness of the pure possible worlds account is capturedin
the categrrncal. aecount by the collection of partial sections over the partially ord-ered.sel_of
all*act s of esane-i o*usaesS.
Anqther woJ--of u-nderstau-dnS po-0-srble lyor,ld! in. t.he catsgorical qgsLext,
sulerimnosed o.n the first, is to consider different sheaveg as radiedly di-ff_erent meaniags
that corild b-e ausigned to the sarue, aets. ThEius,tead-pf.sps!:dens&agrglasheaf 4.q+e
cOuld*ca$idet.otler sheaves in C Shw-hie_h_ruqrd_d-grye perhaps en_tirely diffe,re_q-t eollecti.ous
qfJor6ible-ouiects,---MovemerLb-etween sbeavglwourd be via natural transforma,t_ig-ns,.t}e
amows of C Sh.that wouldsostinue to preserve the temporal dyaamic. with the poteutial
fo' the readmission of a uumber of sheaves in the modelling, 
-the pnssi6-ility-of-exploitias
the--top"qil.lruclure of C 5[ should be explored. The utilization of the subobject classifier
Jor the assignemnt of truth-values to some of the arrows of C Shmay be.a, uleld.s_tratr€y.
In summarJL"tben* tbe modelling presented here, u,sing c4tego,rieal-eonrs-trustll$t,
rgledsJhe dynamies of Husserl's intentionality in a more explicit uranq-er tban doeslhe
Bglsrblerodds-acco un t ol-Smi th and Mclu-tgre a 6
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Smith and Mclntyre's version of Husserl is based on D.W. Smith and R. Mclntyre,
Husserl and Intentionality-A Study of Mind, Meaning, and, Languoge (Dordrecht,
Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1982).
For example, Eusserl's notion of. Sinnor ,meaning, underwent changes , op. cit. p. r24.
For example, those given in H.L. Dreyfus, ed., Husserl, Intentionality, and, Cognitiue
science (cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1982) or that of J.N. Mohanty,
Edmund HusserPs Theory of Meaning (znd ed.) (The Eague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969).
Smith and Mclntyre, op. cif., Chapter VI.
Smith and Mclntyre, op. cit., Chapter VIL
Smith and Mclntyre, op, cit.,pp. A1b-916.
For example, the work of A. Grzegorczyk "A Philosophically Plausible Formal
Interpretation of Intuitionistic Logic", Indagationes Mathematicae,26(1964), bg6--601
and S. Kripke, 
"Semantical Analysis of Intuitionistic Logic I'r, in J.N. Crossley and
M.A.E. Dummett, eds., Formal Systems ond Reanrsiue Functiotl*Proceeilings of
the Eighth LoEic colloquium, osford, JuIy 1963 (Amsterdam: North-Holland
Publishing Company, 19Ob).
versions of the Kripke-Joyal semantics have been given by R. Goldblatt,
Topoi-The Categorial Analysis of Logic, Volume g8 of. Stud,ies in LoEic ond, the
Foundatioru of Mothernatrcs, (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company,
1979), and by A. Kock and G.E. Reyes, I'Doctrines in categorical Logicr, in
J. Barwise, ed., Hand,book of Mathernatical Logic (Amsterdam: North-Holland
Publishing Company, L97T).
Smith and Mclntyrc op. cit., p. 5.
Ibid, Chapters II and III.
Ibid, p. L20.
Ibid, p. L2I.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
t2.
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13. Ibid, p.I4B.
L4. Ibid, p. tG.
15. Ibid,, pp. 196-138.
16. Ibid, p.24L.
17. Ibid, p. 227.
18. Ibid., p.23L.
19. Ibid, p. L95.
20. That is to say, the predicate senses need not be compatible.
2L. Ibid,, p.24G.
22. Ibid, pp.24O-248.
23. Ibid, p.249 and p.254.
24. Ibid,, pp.259-260.
25' Ibid, p.261. In practice, strict compatibility only applies fe familjss of verification
chains characterizing the same further determinations of an obpct. As noted
previously, in the horizon, as such, counterfactual determinations are allowed.
26' The material in this section is principally based on J. Lambek and p.J. Scott,
Inlroduction to Higher Ord,er Cotegoricol Logi*Combridge Stud,ies in Ad,aanced,
Mothemotics 7(Ca,mbridge Cambridge University Press, 1986); Goldblatt, op. cit.;
M'A' Arbib and E.G. ManeE, Anouts, Stnrctures, ond, Functor*The Cotegorical
Imperotiue (New york: Academic press, lgzb); and Kock and Reyes, op. cit.
27 ' In this P&P€r, composition of arrows, functions and functors is written using forward
compositional notation. While this may seem awkward to those familiar with the
usual backward notation of set theory, it makes categorical constructions easier to
read.
28' For the purposes of the present paper, all references to categories are to small
categories, that is to say, to categories in which the collection of arrows between any
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two objects is a set rather than a proper class.
29. In this expression,(C Ar)PP is the po\ryer set of the power set of arrows of C.
30. This first condition is not strictly necessary for the definition of a pretopology, and
both Goldblatt, op. cit. and Kock and Reyes, op. cit.leave it out of their definitions
of pretopologres. It is, however, necessary for the development of a semantics for a
formal language, as well as for the present modelling.
31. Brackets are omitted from compositions that are unambiguous.
32' The function Coa can be extended to a contravariant functor from Cto the category
of sets by assigning to the arrow b &a of C the function that takes a cover of o to
its corresponding cover on 0 by (iv) of the above definition for a pretopology.
33. That is to say, s okF) e bF. Since a germ so in a stalk oF can be identified with the
s
arrow 1 JaF that takes the single element of the terminal object .l into the element
s oof aF, s ogF is a composition of arrows. Again, brackets are omitted whenever the
composition of arrows and functors is uniquely determined.
34. One could argue that this is a degenerate characterization of time, as does, for
slample, M- Heidegget, Being and Tirne, trans. J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson (New
York: Harper and Row, 1962).
35. One may wish to retain more getrsal categories for a number of reasons. For
sxemple, in psychopathological cases in which there are conscious acts but no
consolidation from short-term into long-term memory, one could identify two
separate conscious acts in which virtually identical stimulus situations are
experienced in the same way.
36. Smith and Mclntyrc op. cit., pp. B1b-316.
37. Under such an interpretation, of course, the object does not, in a mathematical sense,
bestow intentionality on the act as this may suggest.
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38. It is assumed here tnat o Lo is a transition to a future act in one of thefi
verification chains for the original act.
39. Smith and Mclntyrc op. cit., p.2Sg.
40. Ibid,, p.259.
4L. Ibid, p.255.
42. Ibid, p.3Ll.
43. Ibid., p.3L4.
44- One could proceed without this restriction by bumping the original category up to the
Heyting algebra of all cribles on C.
45. Smith and Mclntyre, op. cit.,pp.2S6-2b9.
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